Serve downloads with nosniff and a sandbox CSP
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@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ Downloads support range requests, so an interrupted transfer can be resumed:
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curl -C - -O https://beam.example.com/x123abcx/myfile.txt
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```
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Uploaded content is served with `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and
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`Content-Security-Policy: sandbox`, so an uploaded HTML or SVG file opens as a
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sandboxed, script-free document instead of running on the beam origin.
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### Endpoints
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| Method | Path | Purpose |
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@@ -466,6 +466,14 @@ func handleDownload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// The extension lookup relies on the system MIME database, which the
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// Dockerfile provides via the mailcap package.
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", detectContentType(filename))
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// Uploads are anonymous and served back from this origin, so an uploaded
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// .html or .svg opened inline would otherwise be stored XSS. The sandbox
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// directive puts the response in an opaque origin with scripting, forms and
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// top-level navigation disabled; nosniff stops a mislabeled file from being
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// re-typed into something executable. Both are set before ServeContent so
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// they apply to its 206, 304 and HEAD responses too.
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w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
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w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "sandbox")
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// FormatMediaType returns "" for names it cannot encode; don't emit an
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// empty header in that case.
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if disposition := mime.FormatMediaType("inline", map[string]string{"filename": filename}); disposition != "" {
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